

























This  paper  presents  a  dynamic  partial  equilibrium  model  that 
endogenizes  firms'  investment  decision  on  innovation:  product 
innovation  causes  horizontal  expansion  growth,  and  process 
innovation  causes  vertical  expansion  growth.  Market  structure 
in  different  markets  emerges  as  a  consequence  of  different 
investment  on  innovation  opportunities.  Main  variables  that 
constrain  this  structure  in  a  given  market  are  the  rate  of 
scientific  (basic)  discoveries  that  permit  innovation 
productivity,  and  the  degree  of  substitution  between  varieties, 
together with the possible existence of scope economies.  
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1. Introduction and Literature Review 
 
   There  have  been  traditionally  two  different  approaches  to 
the  relation  between  industrial  organization  and  economic 
growth:  The  horizontal  expansion  or  product  innovation 
approach,  taken  by  Dixit-Stiglitz  (1977)  and  Romer  (1990), 
and  the  vertical  expansion  or  process  innovation  approach, 
sometimes also  called quality ladders, as  in Aghion and  Howit 
(1992).  In  the  first  case,  growth  is  caused  by  the  increase  in 
the  number  of  existing  varieties.  In  the  latter  case  the  cause 
is technological improvements on existing products. 
   In  the  real-world  firms  produce  both  types  of  innovations. 
They  may  choose  to  improve  the  quality  of  their  products, 
lower  production  costs,  or  introduce  new  varieties.  Their 
decision  of  how  much  and  in  which  type  to  invest,  like  any 
other  investment  decision,  is  based  on  a  cost-benefit  analysis. 
Does  market  structure  influence  their  decision  or  is  it  the 
other  way  around?  In  other  words,  is  Microsoft  efficient 
because  it  has  market  power,  or  does  it  have  market  power 
because it is efficient? 
   This  paper  presents  a  model  that  endogenizes  firms' 
simultaneous  decision  about  both  types  of  innovation.  This 
decision  is  not  really  a  choice;  it  is  a  survival  necessity  for 
firms.  In  a  high  innovation  environment,  who  doesn’t  follow, 
eventually  dies.  In  this  sense  it  may  seem  that  the  investment 
on  innovation  decision  is  constrained  by  market  structure  but 
this  structure  is  really  a  consequence  of  different  investment 
opportunities  that  exist  in  different  markets.  This  is  a 
different  approach  from  the  standard  paradigm  that  relates 
growth  to  market  structure  (see  Aghion  and  Howit  1998  for  an 
overview). 
   One  consequence  of  the  above  is  that  there  is  reverse 
causality  in  the  Schumpeter  hypothesis.  This  is,  firms  with 
large  market  shares  produce  more  innovation  because  they 
have  more  access  to  capital  markets,  risk  diversification  and 
can  benefit  from  scale  economies  in  R&D.  (Schumpeter  1947). 
The  model  presented  in  this  paper  implies  that  innovation, 
bounded  by  investment  opportunities,  determines  market 
structure,  and  not  the  other  way  around.  Having  this  in  mind, 
it  is  not  surprising  the  apparent  contradiction  of  empirical 
work in search of confirmation for the Schumpeter hypothesis. 
For  example,  some  studies  find  evidence  that  supports  this 
hypothesis,  as  larger  firms  have  higher  patent  rates.  The 
larger  a  firm’s  market  share,  the  more  likely  it  is  to  file 
patents  (see  Liberman  1987).  Others  find  evidence  that 
contradicts  Schumpeter:  In  some  cases,  small  firms  are 
relatively  more  likely  to  make  major  innovations  (see  Scherer 
1984).  Other  studies  report  results  that  seem  contradictory: 
Cohen,  Levin  and  Mowery  (1994)  conclude  that  R&D  intensity 
varies  with  firm  size  in  some  industries  and  not  others,  and   3 
where it does vary, it ay be negatively or positively related to 
size.  We  will  see  that  all  these  results  are  consistent  with  the 
model presented in this paper. 
   It  is  now  for  a  long  time  acknowledged  by  economists,  at 
least since the work of Solow (Solow, 1957) that growth is not 
mainly  caused  by  the  accumulation  of  physical  factors  of 
production  like  capital  and  labour.  For  simplicity  reasons,  the 
model  in  this  paper  does  not  include  capital  or  labour  as 
factors  of  production.  It  uses  only  technology,  because  it  is 
the  main  source  of  growth.  This  is  certainly  a  shortcoming, 
but  smaller  that  the  one  in  textbook  models  that  use  these 
factors  but  do  not  endogenize  innovation.  Also  this  model  can 
be  easily  expanded  to  include  other  factors,  only  at  the  cost 
of some analytical complication.  
   It  has  been  recognized  by  others  before  me  (see,  for 
example,  Baumol  2002)  that  knowledge  is  created  in  a  process 
that  follows  two  types  of  discovery.  Basic  research  creates 
breakthrough  ideas  and  is  done  primarily  by  universities  and 
government  agencies.  I  will  call  these  ideas  inventions.  It  is 
however  the  subsequent  development  of  these  ideas  by  private 
firms  in  search  for  profits  -  innovations  -  that  is  responsible 
for  the  lion's  share  of  the  growth.  Statistical  evidence  of  this 
is  presented  in  Baumol  (2002).  However,  inventions  are  a 
necessary  condition  for  the  innovations  to  exist.  In  other 
words,  the  R&D  process  can  be  divided  in  research  (of 
inventions),  and  development  of  these  inventions  into 
innovations.  This  will  become  clear  with  the  presentation  of 




Figure 1: The R&D process 
 
   This  model  takes  inventions  as  exogenous.  These  have 
existed  since  the  beginning  of  mankind  and  were  frequent  in 
past  civilizations  before  the  industrial  revolution.  It  is 
however  the  unique  nature  of  capitalism  that  allows  them  to 
be  developed  into  innovations,  and  cause  modern  economic 
growth.  
   No  theory  can  be  stated  as  useful  if  it  cannot  be  tested 
empirically.  In  economics  this  often  poses  the  question  of 
observables.  In  case  of  the  study  of  market  structure,  an 
important  question  is  if  when  a  given  market  was  created, 
entry  was  sequential  or  simultaneous.  I  argue  that  in  absence 
of  non-natural  barriers  to  entry,  this  is  mainly  a  matter  of 
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can  only  be  addressed  in  an  historical  perspective,  so  I  will 
not address it at all. Also because of this,  this  model does not 
consider  strategic  behaviour.  The  usage  of  game  theory  would 
also  depend  on  the  nature  of  competition:  we  can  have  Nash 
equilibrium  on  quantities  (Cournot  equilibrium)  or  in  price 
(Bertrand  equilibrium).  Price  (or  quantity)  competition  is  not, 
however,  the  main  kind  of  competition  in  most  markets  today. 
Rather,  in  a  dynamic  environment  it  is  innovation  the  main 
war that firms battle. (see Baumol 2002).  
On  part  2,  the  basic  model  is  presented.  Its  solution  is  in  part 
3,  as  well  as  some  crucial  developments,  such  as  dynamics. 
Economic  policy  and  its  consequences  for  growth  also  appear 
in  this  part.  Part  4  presents  some  conclusions,  and  part  5 
suggests  possible  future  extensions  to  the  model,  as  well  as 
some of its limitations. 
 
 
2. The Model  
 
A. Firms and markets     
 
There  are  s  markets,  and  each  has  v k , t  endogenously 
determined  firms  in  moment  t,  k=1,…,s.  For  now  let's  define 
market  as  a  strong  break  in  the  chain  of  substitution  on  the 
demand  side.  A  more  formal  definition  will  be  given  later  in 
this  paper.  Each  firm  is  assumed  to  use  a  production  function 
of the form:  
 
 (1)                             x i , t = A i , t  
 
   This  is,  the  quantity  produced  of  each  variety  i  in  each 
period  t,  x i , t  is  equal  to  the  technological  level  in  production, 
A i , t ,of  that  variety.  All  varieties  are  heterogeneous  and  each 
variety  is  produced  by  a  single  firm.  The  number  of  varieties 
produced by firm j are n j , t. 
   The  profit  function  for  any  firm  j  takes  the  following  form, 
for each period t:  
 
                             n j,t                                       nj,t 
 (2)                 j , t  =    x i , t p i , t  – c j,t –   d i,t 
                           i=1                     i=1 
 
Where  x i , t  and  p i , t  are  respectively  the  quantity  and  the  price 
of variety i. There are only two types of costs: c j , t is spending 
on  product  innovation  and   
n  j,t
  d  i,t  total  spending  on  process 
innovation.  Marginal  cost  of  both  types  of  innovation  is 
assumed to be constant and equal to  . 
 
Assumption 1. The total number of product innovations in each 
period  t  made  by  each  individual  firm  is  never  very  large.   5 
This  means  that  when  optimizing,  each  firm  will  take  as  null 
the  impact  of  an  additional  variety  on  its  profits  from  the 
varieties that existed in previous periods.  
 
This  assumption  is  necessary  for  the  sake  of  the  analytical 
simplicity  of  the  model.  (this  can  be  easily  seen  in  the 
appendix). 
 
B. Invention and innovation 
 
Process innovation follows the process:  
 
(3)                                     Ai,t+1  –A i,t=  k . Ai,t . di,t   
 
and product innovation follows the process:  
 
(4)                                     ni,t+1  –ni,t =  k . ni,t . cj,t   
 
Where  k is the (exogenous) invention rate which is assumed to 
be  the  same  for  both  kinds  of  innovation  processes.  Note  that 
this  is  a  constant  that  would  correspond  to  a  Poisson  arrival 
rate  in  a  model  with  uncertainty.  New  varieties  are  created 
with initial technology A 0. 
 
Assumption 2. There is a  potentially different invention rate  k 
for each one of the k = 1,…,s  markets.  
 
At  first  this  may  seem  an  odd  assumption.  If  the  invention 
rate  is  related  to  scientific  progress,  it  should  differ  between 
different  scientific  areas,  and  not  between  breaks  in  the  chain 
of  substitution  that  define  different  markets.  This  is  true,  but 
does  not  contradict  assumption  2.  What  is  assumed  is  that 
each  market  has  its  own  invention  rate  because  it  corresponds 
to  some  scientific  area.  In  markets  that  belong  to  close 
scientific  areas,  the  invention  rate  may  be  similar,  or  even 
equal.  Markets  that  are  in-between  two  or  more  areas  will 
have  a  rate  that  reflects  the  degree  of  closeness  to  each. 
Figure 2 presents an example.  
 
 
Figure 2: Inventions and Markets: An example 
Invention rates 
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As  was  empathized  in  the  introduction,  in  the  real  world 
different  sectors  of  the  economy  suffer  scientific  shocks  with 
different  intensities  and  time  lags.  Later  in  this  paper  I  will 
consider  the  effects  on  a  change  in  the  invention  rate  of  a 





Following  Dixit-Stiglitz  (1977),  the  demand  for  variety  i  in 
period t is:  
 
(5)                                  x
d
i , t = (p i , t/ P t)
  k . [y k , t/m t]    
   
The demand y k , t  corresponds to the total demand that in period 
t  is  directed  to  the  industry  k  to  which  variety  i  belongs  to. 
As  this  is  a  partial  equilibrium  model,  it  is  considered 
exogenous.  P t  and  p i , t   are  respectively  the  price  level  and  the 
price  of  variety  i  in  period  t  in  market  k.  (Wherever  clear 
from  the  context  to  which  market  they  belong,  these  shall  not 
be  indexed  by  k.)  The  parameter    k  measures  the  degree  of 
linkage  between  submarkets  of  the  same  market,  in  the  Sutton 
(1998)  fashion.  Lower    k     means,  on  the  demand  side,  less 
substitutability between varieties to the consumers, and on the 
supply  side  it  may  represent  the  existence  of  scope  economies 
in  production  (or  the  existence  of  the  so-called  love  for 
variety).  The  total  number  of  varieties  in  the  industry  in 
period t are m t =  
v k nj,t. 
I will now follow a third assumption. 
 
Assumption  3.  There  is  independence  between  different 
markets.  This  means:  a)  there  is  a  potentially  different    k  for 
each  market.  b)  varieties  are  only  substitutes  between 
submarkets  of  the  same  market  and  never  between  markets. 
Any  scope  economies  that  may  exist  apply  only  inside  the 
same  market.  c)  there  is  a  fixed  and  exogenous  demand  y k , t, 
potentially different for each market k = 1,…,s. 
 
 
D. National Product 
 
   The national product is given by: 
 
                                                           s      mt 
(6)                                            Y t=   ( x i , t)  




   7 
E. Optimization 
 
Each firm's problem is to maximize the intertemporal present 
discounted value of profits:  
 
                                                                                            
(7)                                            sup (   
t   j , t) 
                                                           t=0 
                                                                                                          
The  state  variables  for  each  firm  are  the  technology  level  for 
each  one  of  the  existing  varieties A i,t , i=1,...,nj,t  and  the  total 
number  of  varieties  nj,t.  The  control  variables  are  the  amount 
of  spending  on  innovation  on  each  one  of  the  varieties  i  on 
period  t  (process  innovation),  di,t   ,  i=1,...,nj,t  and  the  amount 
of spending on the development of new products, cj,t . 
   
 
3. Solution and policy  
 
   A. Closed-form solution 
 
It  turns  out  that  a  unique  closed-form  solution  exists  for  the 
optimal  spending  on  each  type  of  investment  on  innovation  in 
each period t. (the proof can be found in the appendix). 
 
                              [(1–1/  k)  Pt+1    k  A i,t 
1 – 1 /   k]
  k (y k , t + 1 m t + 1⁻¹)– 
  k 
  (8)             di,t  = 
 ______________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                                         k  
  k 
and  
 
                            [  Pt+1   k  A0 
1 – 1 /   k]
  k (y k , t + 1 nj,t
  k⁻¹)–[(m t + 1+1)/nj,t] 
 (9)             cj,t = 
   _______________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                                      k  
  k 
 
 
B. The long run 
 
   In  the  short  run  the  number  of  firms  is  fixed.  In  the  long 
run  there  is  free  entry  in  all  markets.  Because  of  this  in  each 
market  there  will  be  entry  until  the  next  firm  could  not 
achieve  positive  discounted  profits.  The  theory  does  not 
exclude  the  possibility  of  different  structures  of  profits 
coexisting in the same market. However, without imposing any 
restriction  relative  to  the  entry  process,  nothing  can  be  said 
about  what  kind  of  structure  will  emerge.  This  requires  an 
additional assumption.  
 
 
   8 
Assumption  4.  There  is  symmetric  equilibrium  in  all  markets, 
but  not  between  different  markets.  This  means  that  in  a  given 
market  k,  all  firms  produce  the  same  output  and  invest  the 
same  on  innovation.  However,  in  different  markets,  these 
quantities obviously vary. 
 
   This  assumption  is  not  essential  for  the  model.  In  fact,  if 
instead  an  assumption  about  the  nature  of  the  entry  process  is 
taken,  the  model  is  valid  and  can  be  used,  only  to  reach 
different conclusion about the final market structure.  
  
   In each market k, the long run condition is: 
 
                                                                               
(10)                                 v k: (   
t   j , t) = 0   for all j.  
                             t=0 
                                                                                                                          
 
C. Economic growth  
 
   Growth  can  occur  for  two  reasons:  New  varieties  or 
improvements  on  the  technology  of  the  existing  ones.  (quality 
improvements).  Investment  on  innovation  is  the  cause  for 
both.  Having in  mind the equation for output (6) it is possible 
to write: 
 
                    Y t + 1                s      v k , t         n j , t          m t     A i , t 
(11)                       
__________   =        (    A0  
__________ +   
 ____________ ) 
                                 Y t + 1         k=1  j=1          n j , t      i=1     A i , t 
 
 
using equations (3) and (4) we get: 
 
                   Y t + 1            s             v k , t              m t  
(12)                       
_________   =    [  k  ( A0  cj,t +  di,t )]           
                                Y t + 1    k=1         j=1           i=1      
 
Where the optimal level of investment in each type of 
innovation can be taken from equations (7) and (8).  
 
 
D. Fiscal policy  
 
   The fiscal multiplier is given by: 
 
 
                                      Yt+1         nj,t     cj,t      nj,t+1     Yt+1    Ai,t+1     di,t         s     Yt+1      k,t    vk,t+1   
(13)      Yt+1 =  Gk,t ( 
________  ________  ________  +        
________  ________  ________  +      
________  ________  ________  ) 
                                      nj,t       cj,t     Gk,t             i=1       Ai,t+1    di,t      Gk,t      k=1      k,t    vk,t+1    Gk,t 
   9 
Note that:  
 
                       d i , t          d i , t          [(1 – 1 /  k )  Pt+1   k  A i,t 
1 – 1 /   k]
  k 
 (14)           
___________   =   
___________   =       
__________________________________________________        
                        G k , t         y k , t                         m t + 1   k  
  k 
 
 
                       c j , t          c j , t          [nj,t    Pt+1   k  A i,t 
1 – 1 /   k]
  k 
 (15)           
___________   =   
___________   =       
   _______________________________________         
                       G k , t         y k , t                         nj,t    k  
  k 
 
Both derivatives are obviously positive.  
The  part  of  the  multiplier  associated  with  the  change  of  the 
number  of  firms  in  the  market  that  received  the  shock  will 
only  have  temporary  effects  if  the  shock  is  temporary. 
However,  regarding  the  two  parts  of  the  multiplier  associated 
with  innovations,  temporary  shocks  will  have  permanent 
effects.  
As  an  example,  let  us  consider  a  positive  temporary 
government  demand  shock.  It  may  seem  that  after  the  demand 
returns to its original value the  optimal amount of innovation, 
and  thus  growth,  returns  to  the  same  amount  as  before.  There 
are  however  permanent  changes  in  the  supply  side.  The  shock 
induces  innovation  that  otherwise  would  not  have  been  done: 
both  the  creation  of  new  products  and  the  improvement  of 
previous.  These  remain  after  the  shock  is  gone.  This  means 
that  the  trajectory  of  the  economy  is  altered  in  a  permanent 
way:  hysteresis  result.  The  degree  of  change  will  be  however 
small unless the public expenditure is very large in proportion 
to  the  original  output.  This  whole  process  can  be  easily  seen 
with a numerical example.  
 
 
E. Monetary Policy  
 
A  similar  process  happens  with  monetary  shocks.  As  long  as 
the  adjustment  of  the  price  level  has  any  lag,  money  is 
nonneutral  even  in  the  long  run,  because  it  changes  the 
economy's  trajectory  permanently.  These  changes  should  be 
however quite modest.  
Also  if  the  discount     rate  is  affected,  this  will  be  another 
channel  of  influence  that  will  have  both  temporary  and 





It  is  useful  to  determine  how  does  total  innovation  in  a  given 
market  varies  with  changes  in  some  of  the  fundamental 
variables  that  vary  between  markets,  an  possibly  trough  time,   10 
notably  the  degree  of  linkage  between  submarkets,  the 
invention rate, and the demand. This is given by: 
 
                          (d i , t+ c j , t) 
                     (16)           
 ______________________  >0 
                                         k 
 
   The proof can be found in the appendix. 
   The  intuition  for  this  result  is  what  follows:  Note  that  the 
linkage between submarkets  k has a positive influence in both 
process  and  product  spending.  This  makes  sense,  because  this 
parameter  measures  the  degree  of  market  power  of  firms  in  a 
given  market.  But  its  weight  is  not  the  same  in  both  cases. 
The  bigger  is   k,  more  will  firms  invest  in  product  innovation 
relatively  to  process  innovation  because  they  will  more  easily 
"steal"  demand  from  other  trajectories  (see  Sutton  1998). 
Then, all else constant, total innovation depends positively on 
the linkage between submarkets  k. 
 
   This can be expressed in graphical terms.  
 
 
Figure 3: Innovation and linkage between submarkets  
 
 
Now remember that  k is just parameter, potentially different 






           
  cj,t + di,t 
              11 
 
 
Figure 4: Optimal Innovation 
 
 
The  next  figure  will  illustrate  an  increase  in  the  linkage 
between submarkets  k. This can represent what happens in two 
different  markets  or  a  change  in  consumer  tastes  (more 





Figure 5: An increase in the linkage between submarkets 
 
 
   Note  that  there  is  an  effect  that  can  not  be  seen  in  the 
figure:  as  total  innovation  increases,  product  innovation 
  
 k 
           
    cj,t + di,t 
            
(cj,t + di,t)*           
  
 k 
           
    cj,t + di,t 
            
(cj,t + di,t)* 1          
(cj,t + di,t)* 2            12 
increases  relatively  more  than  process  innovation:  the  higher 
linkage  between  submarkets  (more  elasticity  of  substitution  to 
the  consumer)  means  a  higher  payoff  to  the  firms  on  investing 
in  process  rather  than  product  innovation.  (because  they  can 
more  easily  capture  demand  from  alternative  varieties  that 
exist  in  the  same  market).  Because  of  this  firms  will 
concentrate  their  efforts  and  spend  relatively  more  on  process 
rather than product innovation in comparison with before. 
 
   An  increase  in  the  invention  rate    k  will  obviously  have  a 
positive  impact  in  both  kinds  of  innovation.  The  next  figure 
shows  this  effect.  This  can  represent  what  happens  in  two 
different  markets,  which  are  equal  in  all  except  in  that 
parameter,  or  an  exogenous  positive  evolution  of  the  rate  on  a 
market, for example because of a scientific breakthrough.  
 
 
Figure 6: An increase in the invention rate 
 
   Total  investment  on  innovation  is  positively  related  to 
market  share.  It  is  possible  to  prove  this  analytically,  but  I 
will  concentrate  in  the  intuition.  Following  assumption  4,  the 
level  of  concentration  in  each  market  can  be  measured  simply 
by  the  number  of  firms  that  the  market  can  support.  For 
example,  if  the  market  can  only  support  one  firm,  we  have  a 
monopoly, and thus maximum concentration.  
 
   Suppose  now  that  on  period  t-1,  all  firms  invest  a  given 
amount  on  innovation.  For  some  reason,  on  period  t  that 
amount  increases.  Note  that  in  the  next  periods  firms  will 
have more capacity, i.e. will have products of superior quality 
and  a  larger  number  of  varieties  that  otherwise  would  have 
existed  if  the  investment  in  innovation  had  stayed  in  the 
original  level.  Because  of  this,  if  all  other  variables  remain 
  
 k 
           
    cj,t + di,t 
            
(cj,t + di,t)* 1          
(cj,t + di,t)* 2            13 
constant  (notably  demand)  the  market  is  capable  of  holding  an 
inferior  number  of  firms  that  otherwise  would  have  been. 
Thus, concentration on that market rises.  
This relation can be represented graphically:  
 
 
Figure 7: Innovation and Market Concentration 
 
Where   j represents the expected market power of firm j in the 
long  run.  This  is  a  subtle  point  that  will  be  made  more  clear 
when the equilibrium analysis is complete.  
We  can  find  the  equilibrium  value  of  concentration  if  we  join 
the  optimal  value  of  investment  in  innovation  found  in  figure 




Figure 8: Equilibrium Concentration 
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Now  about  the  equilibrium  value  for  concentration    j*.  If  firm 
j  does  not  exit  the  market,  it  will  end  up  with  market  power 
  j*.  This  is,  after  entry  and  exit  occur,  in  the  long  run,  the 
firm(s)  that  are  still  in  business  will  have  that  market  power. 
These  will  supposedly  be  the  more  efficient  ones.  If 
assumption  4  holds,  then  market  concentration  can  determined 
based  only  on  the  decision  of  one  firm.  It  is  now  possible  to 
build  a  figure  to  see  what  happens  in  different  markets  where 
somewhat extreme values of the linkage between submarkets  k 
and  the  invention  rate    k  exist,  and  take  the  necessary 
conclusions  on  how  these  parameters  influence  market 
structure.   
    Let  us  then  consider  the  existence  of  four  hypothetical 
markets  that  have  parameter  values  according  to  the  following 
table,  but  are  in  all  else  equal.  By  definition,   ₂> ₂  and 
 ₂> ₂. 
 
 
   ₂   ₂ 
 ₂  Market B  Market D 
 ₂  Market A  Market C 
 
Table 1: Characteristics of four markets 
 
 
We can now build the two basic figures based on this table.  
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Figure 9: Several Markets: Concentration levels 
 
As  it  is  possible  to  see  in  the  above  figures,  maximum 
concentration  will  emerge  on  market  D  whereas  minimum 
concentration  corresponds  to  market  A.  Markets  B  and  C  will 
surely  have  concentration  in-between  those  two.  Note  that  it 
is  not  necessary  that    C*  >    B*  as  depicted  in  the  graph.  The 
contrary  is  possible  depending  on  the  relative  sizes  of  the 
parameters   k  and    k  (remember  that  the  elasticity  of  the 
curves in figure 8 also depend on  k ).   
   The  last  two  figures,  in  association  with  equation  (10)  have 
an  immediate  consequence.  It  is  a  well  known  fact  that  a 
limited  number  of  sectors  in  the  economy  are  responsible  for 
most  of  the  growth.  This  is  what  the  model  predicts  for 
markets with high linkage  k and invention rate   k. 
   
 
4. Conclusion  
 
   The  consequences  of  modern  economic  growth  to  human 
welfare  cannot  be  overstressed.  Growth  is  the  ultimate  reason 
why  the  standards  of  living  in  today's  developed  countries  are 
overwhelmingly  superior  to  what  they  were  during  the  most 
part  of  human  existence  and  in  developing  countries  today. 
Understanding  the  mechanism  that  underlies  beneath  this 
phenomenon  may  give  us  tools  to  control  it,  extend  it  to 
developing  countries,  and  maintain  it  in  a  sustained  way. 
Thus,  explaining  growth  is  a,  if  not  the,  fundamental 
challenge  to  human  knowledge.  The  model  presented  in  this 
paper  attempts  this  task  relating  growth  to  its  ultimate  cause: 
The search from profits from private firms. 
  j 
 
cj,t + di,t 
            
(cj,t + di,t)* A          
            
 j*A 
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   This  model  predicts  that  market  structure  is  ultimately  a 
consequence  of  different  opportunities  that  exist  in  different 
markets.  Given  the  existing  conditions  of  a  market,  firms  will 
have  no  other  choice  but  to  comply  to  a  specific  investment 
strategy.  Because  of  this  markets  characterised  by  different 
degrees  of  linkage  between  submarkets  and  invention  rates 
will  have  different  market  structures  and  will  contribute  in  a 




Figure 10: Theoretical prediction for market structure 
 
   In  markets  where  both  the  linkage  between  submarkets  and 
the  invention  rate  are  high,  process  innovation  is  dominant. 
On  one side, it is profitable for  firms to invest on  only one or 
a  few  trajectories  because  of  the  high  degree  of  linkage 
between  submarkets.  The  few  high  quality  products  that  result 
will  capture  all  demand  (in  a  creative  destruction  process, 
they  will  drive  lower  quality  varieties  out  of  the  market),  so 
markets  will  be  characterised  by  a  limited  number  of  high 
quality  products.  These  will  be  provided  by  a  small  number  of 
firms,  so  that  investment  of  each  can  be  high  to  achieve  high-
quality.  Examples  are  the  cell  phone  manufacturers  (and 
operators)  industry,  and  the  automobile  industry.  The  first 
example  given  is  pragmatic:  The  substitutability  between  two 
different  cell  phones  is  certainly  high.  Inventions  in  this  area 
are  frequent,  and  product  innovations  follow:  smaller  and 
cheaper phones, with camera, internet, and so on. 
   If  however  the  linkage  between  submarkets  is  weak,  the 
payoff  to  a  firm  of  investing  in  a  single  trajectory  is  not  that 
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invest  much  in  a  single  trajectory,  you  need  one  big  firm. 
However,  to  invest  much  in  a  large  number  of  varieties  as  in 
this  case,  you  may  have  several  firms  investing  in  several 
trajectories.  Because  of  this,  these  markets  are  less 
concentrated that those with high linkage between submarkets. 
An  example  is  the  pharmaceutical  industry.  In  this  industry 
the  substitution  between  varieties  is  small,  and  scope 
economies  are  likely  to  exist;  Therefore,  the  linkage  between 
submarkets of the market for drugs is weak. On the other hand 
this  is  a  sector  where  science  is  active  and  new  discoveries 
are  frequent.  Because  of  this  the  invention  rate  is  high.  What 
follows is the proliferation of product innovations. 
   Now  regarding  the  markets  where  the  linkage  between 
submarkets  is  high  but  the  invention  rate  is  low.  The 
innovation  process  in  these  sectors  in  unproductive,  however 
investment  in  a  limited  number  of  trajectories  is  the  right 
choice.  Because  of  this,  firms  will  probably  be  characterised 
by  high  investment  in  advertisement  of  those.  A  lot  of 
products  that  are  strongly  advertised  effectively  fall  in  this 
category:  shampoos,  industrial  food  industry  and  soft  drinks, 
hypermarkets. 
   Finally,  there  are  some  markets  in  which  both  the  linkage 
between  submarkets and the invention rate are low. These  will 
be  sectors  of  low  growth  and  possibly  high  turbulence  (a  lot 
of  entry  and  exit)  as  they  have  trouble  adapting  to  changing 
conditions.  The  restaurant  business  is  a  good  example.  Why 
doesn’t  this  happen  in  other  sectors?  One  reason  is  that 
assumption  4  does  not  hold  in  most  other  sectors  but  it 
probably  does  in  this  one.  Remember  that  this  assumption  was 
only  taken  so  we  could  ignore  the  nature  of  the  entry  process. 
In  the  real-world  only  marginal  firms  have  null  profits.  In 
most  markets  more  efficient  firms  will  have  positive  profits 
that  can  be  adjusted  preventing  entry  or  exit.  However  in  this 
sector  most,  if  not  all,  firms  are  truly  marginal.  Because  of 
this,  adjustment  can  only  be  made  by  entry  and  exit,  causing 
economic turbulence. 
   Note  that  an  artificial  change  of  the  market  structure,  for 
example  anti-concentration  legislation,  will  certainly  have 
consequences  to  the  firms'  investment  decisions,  and  thus 
growth. 
   It  is  common  sense  that  some  (maybe  most)  sectors  are  not 
truly  responsible  for  economic  growth,  while  others  are  the 
main  driving  forces.  The  usual  explanation  is  demand 
oriented, i.e. new demand is for sectors with high elasticity of 
income.  (Engel’s  law  is  an  example).  This  model  provides  an 
alternative  supply-side  result.  (note  that  all  the  analysis  took 
market demand, as well as demand growth, as taken).  
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5. Extensions and limitations  
 
   Several  extensions  can  be  made  to  the  model:  uncertainty, 
non  constant  returns  do  innovation,  explicit  consideration  of 
scope  and  scale  economies,  love  for  variety,  other  factors  of 
production  and  strategic  interactions  between  firms. 
Principal-agent  problems  can  also  be  considered.  An 
especially  interesting  extension  would  be  to  turn  the  model 
into general equilibrium. 
   One  limitation  of  the  model  is  that  it  does  not  consider  the 
imitation  issue.  Firms  innovate  by  imitating  as  well  as  doing 
their  own  research.  Thus,  this  is  an  alternative  that  should  be 
considered.  However  the  results  subtly  depend  on  the  nature 
of assumptions regarding the nature of the patenting process. 
    The  model  can  be  tested  empirically  using  observables  as 
proxies  for  the  main  parameters  of  the  model.  A  homogeneity 
index  can  be  used  in  relation  to  the  linkage  between 
submarkets  (see  Sutton  1998).  About  the  invention  rate, 
several measures can be used. Industry usage of human capital 
of  specific  scientific  areas  is  an  example.  Public  investment 
in  research  is  supposed  to  increase  the  rate,  possibly  with 
decreasing  marginal  productivity.  Specific  events,  for 
example,  an  arms  race,  will  affect  primarily  certain  sectors. 
As  this  is  a  theoretical  paper,  I  will  leave  these  details  to 






Proof of equations (7) and (8):  
 
The solution can be obtained using dynamic programming. The 
objective  function  is  (6).  The  constraints  are  (1),  (2),  (3),  (4) 
and  (5).  The  state  variables  are  n j , t  and  A i , t  for  i=1,...,  n j , t. 
The control variables are c j , t and d i , t for i=1,..., n j , t.  
  
We are now able to set up the Bellman equation:  
 
(A1)            V(A i , t, n j , t) = sup [   j , t +   V(A i , t + 1, , n j , t + 1 ⁻ A i , t, n j , t) ] 
  
The first-order conditions are:  
 
                            V(A i , t + 1, , n j , t + 1 ⁻ A i , t, n j , t) 
(A2)                       =     
________________________________________________    
                                                                 d 1 , t 
 
 
                                                                . . . 
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                             V(A i , t + 1, , n j , t + 1 ⁻ A i , t, n j , t) 
(A3)                       =     
_________________________________________________    
                                                                  dn j , t , t  
 
 
                            V(A i , t + 1, , n j , t + 1 ⁻ A i , t, n j , t) 
(A4)                       =     
________________________________________________    
                                                                   c j , t 
 
 
   Note that these correspond to the usual marginal cost equals 
marginal revenue conditions.  
   Solving  the  first  order  conditions  (A2)  to  (A3)  is 
straightforward.  After  using  the  chain  rule  on  the  right  hand 
side  and  substituting  restriction  (3),  when  solving  in  order  to 
d i , t  we get equation (8). 
 
For  solving  the  right  hand  side  of  (A4)  it  is  necessary  to  use 
assumption 1.  
Using the chain rule:  
 
                             V(A i , t + 1, , n j , t + 1 ⁻A i , t, n j , t)         n j , t 
(A5)                       =     
________________________________________________   
___________  
                                                                    n j , t                      c j , t 
 
 
development of the second term:  
 
 
                          V(A i , t + 1, , n j , t + 1 ⁻A i , t, n j , t)     
(A6)                     
           ________________________________________________   = 
                                         n j , t                    
 
 
                                                             nj,t+1                                             nj,t+1   
 
= A0
(1-1/ k) Pt+1 [yk,t+1 /(mt+1+1)]
 1/ k  – [   Ai,t
(1-1/ k) Pt+1 (yk,t+1 /mt+1)
1/ k –   Ai,t
(1-1/ k) Pt+1 (yk,t+1 /mt+1+1)
1/ k ] 
                                                             i=1                                               i=1 
 
 
                                                                   equal to zero by assumption 
 
 
Substituting the above and restriction (4) on (A5), the result 
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  k (ln  +ln nj,t +ln A0 /  k  – ln  )+  
  k / mt+1 [ ln   +(1/  k – 1)+ (ln Ai,t ) /  k – ln  ]+ln  (1/ nj,t [mt+1 +1])} 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________                                                                                                                        




where     =      k  Pt+1  A0
(1-1/ k)  and     =  (1-1/ k)      k  Pt+1  Ai,t
(1-1/ k).  The 
expression  is  positive  assuming  the  marginal  cost     is  not 
disproportionately  large  in  comparison  to  the  other  variables 
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